63 ideas
10888 | Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo] |
10889 | The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo] |
10890 | A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo] |
10886 | Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo] |
10887 | Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo] |
10897 | A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo] |
10893 | Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo] |
10899 | Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo] |
10896 | Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
10898 | The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo] |
10902 | We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo] |
10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |
10895 | 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo] |
10900 | Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo] |
10901 | Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo] |
10894 | A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo] |
10903 | A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
10891 | If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo] |
14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
13132 | A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff] |
14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong] |
16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
11891 | Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P] |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
6356 | Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz] |
9086 | The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga] |
9087 | Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga] |
16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |
9085 | If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga] |
9084 | Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga] |
20704 | A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B] |
7482 | Resurrection developed in Judaism as a response to martyrdoms, in about 160 BCE [Anon (Dan), by Watson] |
1474 | Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG] |
1475 | It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG] |